Monday, 26 April 2021

LOGIC: Did they get it wrong?

Logic simply confirms the rules for object behaviors through contradiction and tautology, and does not have a transcendental basis.

For example,
if 'p and not-p' is a contradiction then we express the rules for physical objects, and
if 'p and not-p' is a tautology then we express the rules for phenomenal objects.
if 'either p or not p' is a tautology then we express the rules for physical objects, and
if 'either p or not p' is a contradiction then we express the rules for phenomenal objects (such as colours).

This legitimises contradiction, authorising it not as a censure as it is delivered by traditional logic, but as a descriptor with the same status as tautology.

The problem is that traditional logicians fail to notice the assumption that their logic is physicalist, so a contradiction appears as a censure, and not as a description of phenomenal object behavior.

In that regard, it is important to realise that there can be no expression of censure or process of deduction in logic that uses it, and that if one attempts to express it, as in '"physical p and not physical p" is a contradiction', then we simply make a mis-statement, which in the end is equivalent to: ' '

The attempt to fill in the void in that last set of inverted commas is what made Wittgenstein feel the need to remind us about saying and showing, that such a void cannot be filled.

Logic does not use, apply or oversee deduction, its lengthy "deductive" processes are mingled expressions of object behaviors and mis-statements, the latter of which should be left void.
Like every other post shown here, this has not been academically aired before, so I'm mindful of its first expression here.


Wednesday, 4 April 2018

SELF-REFERENCE Which is "this sentence"?
A pointing, self-referential language is always animistic. Pointing or referring is always a mapping, and mappings are intentional.

Thus, a self-referential syntax must be transcendentally ideal. Whereas, all of mathematics is currently transcendentally real. The difference between them is that the former sets up syntax through enabling (intentional) conditions, while the latter sets up syntax through the syntax itself.

Transcendental idealism and transcendental realism are the two mutually exhaustive and exclusive possible interpretations of syntax.

In other words, a mathematics that deploys a transcendentally ideal syntax is animistic and independent of a mathematics that deploys a transcendentally real syntax. Self-reference cannot be represented in our current transcendentally real mathematics.

Sunday, 22 May 2016

The "MANY WORLDS " hypothesis

We ought not to ask whether an event has occurred or not - events only arise in the context of a world. And as far as worlds go, there is a distinction between worlds that are identical and worlds that are not. The former are uncountable.

"Counterfactuals" and "factuals" are terms that cannot be applied to "many worlds". We cannot single out events from a world. We can describe an event only in the context of a world.

There is a problem with that also. For it looks as though "many worlds" must be imaged or viewed from the context of only one world - the world that we know. As such, they appear as empty surrogates of our world, for which their description as "actuality" is a conceit.

"Many worlds" is a "transcendentally real" formulation. The idea supposes that objects are carved out in Nature and correspond to their appearances, independently of that appearance.

In "transcendental idealism", however, there is no prospect for "many worlds", no prospect for objects as independent existents. In TI objects are items of knowledge constructed from templates of experience. To premise the idea of other worlds and the same but "other" selves on the notion of our own world requires a template that isn't found in our world.

Sunday, 17 January 2016

The Integral Text - A textual mechanism responsible for the analytic/continental divide, and divides in general.

A textual mechanism underpinning the analytic/continental divide, and academic divides in general. My thesis presents arguments in support of the idea that the source of the analytic-continental divide is organizational and is not grounded in conceptual differences or partisanship. It is a problem that is a consequence of the structure of the University "text" itself. This text I refer to as the integral text. It is a tangible, self-referring, non-subjective structure through which the University stores knowledge and retains influence.

Wednesday, 21 January 2015

Random Events?

Are there random events? Neither an affirmation nor a denial can redeem a confusion. Chance, or a random event, refers to the internal structure, or source, of an event if, and only if, that structure or source has not been allocated or identified. The idea of randomness as a "inherent property" identifies not the lack of a property, but a failure to denote the idea of one.

Saturday, 28 June 2014


Altruism is against one's own self.
Any self is one's own self.
Any self constitutes all selves.
Altruism is against all selves.

Sunday, 15 June 2014

Is Intelligence an Ability?

I argue that intelligence is not an ability. IQ and intelligence are marks of a social movement that is conceptually grounded on the idea of the "universal object". The universal object is an object, and its behavior, that is supposedly present to all life-forms, and that all life-forms have a measurable ability to articulate. More than an anthropomorphic formulation, though humankind is its primary focus, the "universal object" is a premise, an assumption, that appears to facilitate the comparative measure of the ability of not only individuals, but species. I challenge that premise.