LOGIC: Did they get it wrong?

Logic simply confirms the rules for object behaviors through contradiction and tautology, and does not have a transcendental basis.

For example,

if 'p and not-p' is a contradiction then we express the rules for physical objects, and

if 'p and not-p' is a tautology then we express the rules for phenomenal objects.

And,

if 'either p or not p' is a tautology then we express the rules for physical objects, and

if 'either p or not p' is a contradiction then we express the rules for phenomenal objects (such as colours).

This legitimises contradiction, authorising it not as a censure as it is delivered by traditional logic, but as a descriptor with the same status as tautology.

The problem is that traditional logicians fail to notice the assumption that their logic is physicalist, so a contradiction appears as a censure, and not as a description of phenomenal object behavior.

In that regard, it is important to realise that there can be no expression of censure or process of deduction in logic that uses it, and that if one attempts to express it, as in '"physical p and not physical p" is a contradiction', then we simply make a mis-statement, which in the end is equivalent to: ' '

The attempt to fill in the void in that last set of inverted commas is what made Wittgenstein feel the need to remind us about saying and showing, that such a void cannot be filled.

Logic does not use, apply or oversee deduction, its lengthy "deductive" processes are mingled expressions of object behaviors and mis-statements, the latter of which should be left void.

Like every other post shown here, this has not been academically aired before, so I'm mindful of its first expression here.